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SUSTAINABILITY OF WATER AND SANITATION SYSTEMS
Sustainability with large communally owned systems
Brian Copeland, Uganda
THE KEY TO the successful sustainability of a system is the
mobilisation of public awareness and co-operative spirit
to the needs of maintenance, hygiene, sanitation and
costs, and the matching of the system to the specific
community, or in the case described, the several dispa-
rate communities. With large systems covering a large
area and with public access to standpipes, this presents
special problems due to complexity, population size and
institution building, increasing the load on mobilisers
progressively as the system grows.
In 1992, Wateraid, with initial funding from DANIDA
took on the reconstruction and enlargement of the Bwera
Water Project, begun in 1987 to a Carl Bros plan and build
by DWD. It was far too small and had broken in many
places.
After further survey, the mainline was relaid, a proper
intake built at the source and a further 16 reservoirs of 70-
100,000 1 built, and some hundreds of kilometres of pipe
laid. Still under construction (in May '95 11 out of 16
parishes had been completed) it will have about 900
standpipes in 16 parishes covering perhaps 250km2.
We employ 25 salaried local staff and had originally
64(4 from each parish) volunteers to be trained in main-
tenance. Of these only a few can now be relied upon as
they were never paid, but once a parish is ‘on line’ then
they are paid by the community for repairs. The parishes
also supply community labour for trenching etc., locally
available materials such as sand and meals to work
crews.
Bwera is in west Uganda, Bukunjo County, and the
River Lubiriha, from which the water is taken, forms the
Ugandan/Zairean border at this point 20 1/sec are di-
verted to a population of 60,000 and the system is de-
signed for 80,000 by 2001 providing 201/h/d. Organisa-
tion reflects the Ugandan RC system of government of
participation through elected representatives at differ-
ent administrative levels (a bit like the Poder Popular of
Cuba). Each parish has a reservoir and distribution sys-
tem for which it is responsible. There are 5 elected
committee members and a further 1 from each parish
elected to the Central Committee, which therefore has 16
members of which again 5 form the executive. Each
tapstand has a committee of 3, for maintenance, hygiene
and rate collection (receipts given), and each parish
decides it's own constitution. The Cen.Comm. is respon-
sible for repair and maintenance to the main supply line
(common to all) payment of fees/salaries to permanent
or hired staff, upkeep of central office, monitoring per-
formance and arranging audits. Of the present monthly
rate of 400/1 (30p) per household 20% goes to the
Cen.Comm. The Bwera Water Association is now a reg-
istered indigenous NGO, and its patron the Rt. Hon.
Crispus Kionga, Minister of Internal Affairs, who was
the original government initiator of the project long
before Wateraid arrived.
Problems foreseen were a belief that water is free and
therefore resistance to regular payment, the lack of exist-
ing grass-root organisations with which to work, and the
belief that donors not only provide but should also
maintain, and the generally low educational/income
level of this poor but developing area. The concept of
community ownership was difficult to explain and de-
vise as it would have been in Watford or Dallas, since,
like us, they expect ‘top down’ provision. Not foreseen
were:
1a The arrival and rapid growth of the Customs Market
and its future development as a ‘Duty Free Zone’ at
the border trading point
b. The planned 200 bed hospital, funded by EADB, with
staff quarters, which alone will take as much water as
a parish.
c Immigration to the area due to trade, at present
estimated at 50/month in the town alone, and further
immigration from the mountains to the plains now
supplied with potable water, to exploit the high cof-
fee prices.
d. The amount of water abuse for car washing, brick-
making and construction in a booming area, and
irrigated gardens.
These are problems of rapid development and apart
from 1d beyond the commitment of Wateraid. They will
however shorten the useful life of the system.
Mobilisation difficulties
As usual, the devil is in the detail.
2a The system is too large to be comprehensible to the
layman and there is a total lack of awareness of the
technical and administrative inter-relatedness of its
constituent parts. Explanations are involved and tech-
nical. The wananchi are only interested in the bottom
line.
b. The general attendance at meetings is about 2%, and
usually no more than 5% even at handover ceremo-
nies. Even elected representatives won't attend un-
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less we feed them. People of course have other things
to do, but it makes communication and the dissemi-
nation of information difficult.
c. Mistrust of money collectors. This is well placed, as
some elected rate collectors and representatives have
absconded with funds and even the local bank has
stolen from the parish accounts which took 18 months
to resolve. Low educational levels make accounting
procedures incomprehensible to the wananchi and
difficult for committee treasurers.
d. Elected members of committees volunteered their
services in the erroneous belief that there would be a
salary or fee when Wateraid depart. They will not
continue to work for nothing, therefore allowances
must come from rates. Ergo, rates must rise.
e. It was only after 2½ years in to the project when we
had 5 parishes ‘on line’ that we had payment regis-
ters, which might be relied on. Although beginning
well at around 90% they soon fell to an average of 23%
in Oct. '94. After a serious effort by mobilisers they
then rose a bit, but in May 95 are again falling to a level
to low to maintain the system.
f. A the outset, only 1 mobiliser was needed to organise
the pilot community for labour; trenching, backfilling,
soakaways, pipeline marking, hygiene and sanita-
tion. As the number of parishes increased, it was still
necessary to constantly return to ones considered
complete to reinforce messages, sort out problems at
tapstand level etc, while at the same time mobilising
for construction on many other parishes being con-
structed in parallel. The load on mobilisers was there-
fore greatly underestimated, even though we were
uniquely lucky to find a partner organisation in
Kasanga CBHC to undertake Health and Sanitation
aspects. It had been hoped that committee members
would themselves be active in mobilisation but again,
without recompense, they had other things to do.
They need to earn a living, and so not surprisingly
regard such duties as employment. Altruism is an
unaffordable luxury.
Other worries
3a. There had been problems of our workers 'moonlight-
ing’, by fixing private connections. This is now for-
bidden, but when we leave and they no longer have a
source of income, it is unlikely they will restrain
themselves. If the better off begin installing showers
and baths, consumption will quickly rise again.
b. Spares acquisition; Most of the pipe laid was HDPE ,
not manufactures in Uganda. Both Kenyan and UK
pipe face import surcharges and procurement diffi-
culties. DWD were excluded from maintenance be-
cause of the accompanying loss of public accountabil-
ity and the difficulties they have in maintaining their
present workload.
c. That demand will exceed supply very quickly lead-
ing to water shortages and a further fall-off in rate
payment. There is no understanding of the carrying
capacity of the 6" main, which was not the result of
design, but left to Uganda on the break-up of the EAF.
d. That our best trainees and technicians would sell
their skills elsewhere at a rate unaffordable by their
committees. They also know how to manipulate the
system for sectional interests if pressure or induce-
ment is sufficient.
Attempts to solve these problems
1. Supply problems caused by points 1, a, b, c are a
future problem for the development of the areas,
beyond the committment of Wateraid. Local govern-
ment has been informed of our concerns but seem
unlikely to revise their plans. 1d will be addressed by
having bye-laws passed, regarding the use and abuse
of potable water. We count on the co-operation of the
Combolo chiefs and RC system for enforcement.
2a Continued repetition of the message that all leaks and
breakdowns must be reported immediately to parish
trainees or committee members, followed by shut-
down of affected area until repair. Hammer home
need to pay water rates.
b. A small budget of 50,000/- (£32) per quarter was set
aside for food for important meetings to encourage
attendance. This too will have to be funded from the
water rate when we leave.
c. A training programme in book-keeping, budgeting
and management will commence in June '95. A bit too
late maybe, but there were many difficulties encoun-
tered. The almost cultural pursuit of embezzlement
will remain a problem.
d. A system of attendance fees and allowances was
worked out with committee members. People will
not take long-term responsibility without recompense.
Salaries/fees for future permanent staff agreed be-
tween Cen.Comm and trainees at locally affordable
rate. (Much lower than the NGO rate).
e. We hope that the enforcement of bye-laws, though co-
ercive will be seen as a necessary part of a ‘carrot and
stick’ approach.
f. The number of mobilisers was increased to 3, then to
5.0. Our Programme Support Unit helps Kasanga
CBHC for a couple of days each month and has
trained some of our mobilisers, but we cannot claim
to have solved the difficulties of community mobili-
sation for payment of water rates. The level of re-
sources allocated to this aspect has to be much higher
with ‘open access’ systems and community manage-
ment, and our mobilisers who are necessarily local
Bakonjo speakers have no engineering or other train-
ing, but fly by their pants.
3a We hope that bye-laws will prevent this, but ‘money
finds a way’.
b. A stock of spares left with the Cen.Comm. and tool
kits with each parish. Water-Aids continued presence
in Uganda will facilitate overseas procurement if
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necessary, but again this will have to come from
water rates.
c. Repetition of the limitations of the supply system,
and the setting of inlet valves to reservoirs at design
population flow rates and then padlocked. A weak
point since so many people are now trained in the
system that it can be manipulated for sectional inter-
est and destroy the balance of supply.
Results
As of May '95, rate payments are still too low to maintain
the system satisfactorily. Bye-laws are still pending al-
though passed at RC5 level and there is still some local
political in-fighting over who controls the system and its
assets to be ironed out. Such a large system potentially
generates a large cash-flow and employment opportuni-
ties. Mobilisation will continue for a year after the con-
struction phase has finished. We await further data once
bye-laws are in place.
Recommendations and lessons learned
1. With hindsight, it would have been simpler and
needing less social engineering if water shops had
been set up at agreed points and fitted with meters.
The attendant would then be paid a percentage of the
rate collection measured by the meter, and payment
to committees could also have been checked against
measured delivery. However, the original system
had open access via standpipes and I presume that
this was simply continued.
2. “Professional” agencies such as Wateraid, which have
large local salaried staff have inevitable cost ceilings
and time horizons. Engineering planning, while at-
tempting Critical Path Analysis, faces procurement
problems common to the continent which turn ETA's
into no more than hopes, while system software, ie.
the social engineering must be opened, varying ac-
cording to regions, peoples and local experience. The
pressure for ‘top down’ solutions increases with the
size of the project and the financial implications of
over-run. “Volunteer” agencies  without local sala-
ried staff, whose only cost is the predictable one of
capital costs of hardware and freight may well be
more effective where systems are smaller or time
horizons indefinite.
3. Other areas or countries may well provide a different
experience. The Bakonjo are a self-reliant people with
little co-operative organisation or institutions. The
socio-political groups of societies which have under-
gone popular armed struggle may well provide bet-
ter vehicles for co-operation and organisation. The
RC system, while admirable, was not the result of
grassroot experience. This should be taken into ac-
count when designing systems and service delivery.
4. It is now realised that mobilisation is a far larger
component of sustainability than was believed. The
Chief and RC system were not invited to become
involved until it was clear that rate payment was
below that necessary to maintain the project. Such
organisational and legal aspects should be antici-
pated and form either part of the information pro-
vided, or ideally arise from participatory organisa-
tional design.
5. It was later realised that a significant part of default
was unintentional but the result of seasonal crop
payments. A larger part of default was embezzlement
by collectors (many have been dismissed or have
absconded).
6. Reticulation was designed to make maximum use of
supply potential without other reserve than popula-
tion growth. This may not have been a good idea, as
large systems are likely to generate their own growth
factors.
7. The necessity of common accounting systems and
training in budgeting, book-keeping and manage-
ment.
8. The Wateraid PSU unit was not constituted until the
project was well underway. In future they should be
incorporated at the earliest opportunity and with
adequate resources for training trainers, especially in
such large public systems requiring rate payments
and large area consensus. A more participatory ap-
proach could then be implemented in which solutions
to anticipated problems would arise from within the
community. Project completion dates seem to argue
for a more didactic approach which appears a shorter
route. If ‘gift horses’ are not to become ‘on site’ to
direct their efforts efficiently.
9. Wateraid local staff are paid at the going NGO rate,
which is many times the commercial labour rate. This
sets a benchmark expectation on our departure which
cannot be fulfilled from community resources. We
should consider carefully the inflationary implica-
tions of our belief in ‘a decent living wage’ as in the
long run it is the poor who suffer the worst of its
effects. A larger social wage might be an alternative.
Our best technicians and fieldworkers will be lost to
the system when we stop paying them.
10. The problems caused by embezzlement are likely to
continue in this area, and at standpipes, and a thou-
sand people handling funds, it seems inevitable that
the mice will nibble the seedcorn, while meticulous
policing would have further costs which would have
to be reflected in the water rate if implemented.
11. Development is a long learning process in which the
lessons learned are not universally applicable and
formulae which are not flexible should be avoided.
However I realise that in order to convince a people
that we seriously intend to proceed with a project,
they must first see pipe being laid, but that construc-
tion quickly outruns social organisation unless far
greater effort is put onto this area otherwise it is very
difficult to rectify mistakes made in organisational
design.
